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Abstract 
Organizations are under increasing pressure to exhibit the value of their outsourcing. However, 
previous IS outsourcing research studies failed to provide evidence on how IT client-provider 
relationships should be managed to ensure outsourcing success. This article draws on theories of 
transaction cost and social exchange to develop a model examining outsourcing relationship 
governance mechanisms. Important determinants of contractual and relational governance and the 
effectiveness of the control mechanisms on relational outcomes, opportunism and commitment, are 
examined. This research agenda may theoretically extend IS outsourcing research by incorporating a 
framework to explore outsourcing relationship management and to practically explain software 
outsourcing phenomenon.  






With the development of IS outsourcing, the domain of the client-provider relationship is receiving 
increasing attention. A number of researchers have listed the client-provider relationship as a key 
element of successful IS outsourcing (e.g. Grover & Cheon & Teng 1996, Klepper 1995). 
Conventionally, the outsourcing relationship is viewed as a contractual relationship basing on 
transaction cost theory (TCT), and outsourcing success is found to be determined by transaction 
attributes (Wang 2002). Recent IS literature, however, has stressed the importance of developing a 
partnership-style environment with service provider and a number of models have been proposed for 
developing and sustaining the relationships (e.g. Lee & Kim 1999).  
We found there is a need in IS fields to provide evidence on how IT client-provider relationships 
should be governed in order to ensure outsourcing success. Actually, literature has noticed that 
exchange relationships evolving over time may move from discrete, short-term, price-focused 
transactional end to the multidimensional, social, long-term enduring relational end (Dwyer & Schurr 
& Oh 1987). This transactional-relational continuum concept, arguing that interfirm relationship can 
simultaneously involve both relational and transactional governance mechanisms (Cannon & Achrol 
& Gundlach 2000), may render helps on IT/IS outsourcing relationship management. Hence, based on 
transaction cost theory (TCT), social exchange theory (SET) and governance studies, this study 
examined important determinants of contractual and relational governance and the effectiveness of the 
governance mechanisms on relationship outcomes. The objectives of our framework are to study the 
following questions:  
• What factors would lead to different governance mechanisms? 
• What governance mechanisms would the firm choose under different circumstances?  
• How should the client-provider relationship be governed to ensure successful outsourcing 
relationships?  
The next section provides the general background of the study, including a brief literature review, and 
the theoretical basis. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
2.1  IS Outsourcing Relationships Studies  
In prior IS outsourcing (ISO) success studies, researchers mainly focused on the factors that impact the 
success of outsourcing from two perspectives:  
THE FIRST PERSPECTIVE is from the view of transactional relationship. Case studies of IT 
outsourcing relationships found that the use of detail contracts, penalty clauses, short term 
arrangements, IT legal experts were effective mechanisms for establishing a client’s power in the 
relationships and achieving successful outsourcing outcomes (e.g. Lacity & Willcocks & Feeny 1995). 
Wang (2002) adopting TCT as the theoretical foundation, empirically confirmed the implications of 
transaction attributes (reputation, uncertainty, asset specificity) on the consequences of post-
contractual opportunism and customized software outsourcing success.  
THE SECOND PERSPECTIVE is partner relationship perspective. Recent research in outsourcing has 
used social theories, based on trust and commitment, to explain successful long-term IS outsourcing 
relationships. Grover et al. (1996) examined the relationships between degrees of outsourcing with 
outsourcing success and found elements of partnership such as trust, cooperation, and communication 
are important for outsourcing success. Based on a social perspective, Lee and Kim (1999) found 
partnership quality can serve as a key predictor of outsourcing success. Lee (2001) examined the 
relationship between knowledge sharing and outsourcing success. The results indicated that 
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partnership quality plays a critical role as a mediator between knowledge sharing and outsourcing 
success.  
The separated view of examining the relationship as transactional and relational may cause problem. 
Sanders, Gebelt and Hu (1997) showed evidence in a case study that both tight contracts (transactional 
relationship) and partnership-style were associated with successful outsourcing outcomes. Furthermore, 
both contractual arrangements and partnership management are found important to the client-vendor 
outsourcing relationship (Fitzgerald & Willcocks 1994). Poppo and Zenger (2002) advocated that 
there is a need to explore and predict the interorganizational exchange relationship between formal 
contracts and relational governance.  
2.2 Governance Mechanisms and Theories  
Among research investigating interfirm relationships, two fundamental dimensions appeared to be of 
key importance for the governance and management of such relationships: contractual and relational 
governance (Sobrero & Schrader 1998). The conceptual background for these two control mechanisms 
is found in the combination of TCT(e.g. Coase 1937, Williamson 1975),  and SET (e.g. Homans 1958, 
Blau 1964), the two dominant theoretical perspectives used in the literature on exchange governance 
(e.g. Joshi & Stump 1999). TCT essentially explains the organization's boundaries by examining the 
transaction as the unit of analysis with two key assumptions: bounded rationality and opportunism. 
While SET premises that exchange may involve both social and economic outcomes. SET suggests 
that there is an alternate form of governance with the relationship that tends to rely more on trust, 
commitment and relational norms than strictly on written contracts (Heide & John 1992).  
As for the consequences of the governance mechanisms, prior literatures identified direct relationship 
or combined relationship between contractual/relational governance and relational outcomes, such as 
opportunism (e.g. Cavusgil & Deligonul & Zhang 2004), exchange performance (e.g. Ferguson & 
Paulin & Bergeron 2005), or relationship success (Vasylchenko 2005).  
On the other hand, three sets of determinants of governance mechanisms have been found: transaction 
factors from TCT, relational attributes from SET, and resource attributes (such as technological 
capabilities (Ojode 2000)) from resource-based theory (e.g. Barney 1991). The study will focus on 
TCT and SET perspective, therefore, only first two sets of antecedents were considered. Joshi and 
Stump (1999) based on TCT, examined and verified the relationship between transaction attributes 
(asset specificity, market turbulence) and manufacture process control, which is unilateral (formal) 
governance. Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) developed a model include the relational variable of trust 
and transactional variables to explain relational governance. Ferguson et al. (2005) found that the 
relational factor (boundary-spanner closeness) would be positively related to both relational and 
contractual governance with relational governance dominated the role. Sobrero and Schrader (1998) in 
a meta-analysis found that the task characteristics (asset specificity and uncertainty) may influence 
relational and contractual coordination as exchange governances.  
However, it is surprisingly to find that there are few study systematically examined antecedents of 
contractual and governance mechanisms from both the underlying theoretical perspectives: TCT and 
SET. Furthermore, few studies have identified what are the crucial factors that determinate the use of 
relational versus contractual governance. There is also a need verify the relationship between 
governance mechanisms with relational outcomes. Therefore, this study will fill in the important 
research gaps by incorporating governing mechanisms in the area of software outsourcing. 
2.3 Software Project Study  
Johnson (2000) reported that more than 70% of the software outsourcing projects suffered total failure, 
cost overruns, schedule overruns, or deliver fewer functions than promised. Accordingly, software 
outsourcing may face even harder challenges. Wang (2002) raised that software outsourcing: (1) may 
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request specific investment including human capitals; (2) may face many unforeseen contingencies 
such as, the system’s completion date, the cost and the client’s responsibilities; (3) opportunism may 
occur in such uncertainties. It is a field that practitioners face real challenges to cope with contractual 
and relational control issues. Facing these difficulties, effective ways to manage the IT client-provider 
relationship are crucial.  
 
3 MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES  
Therefore, based on two theories, TCT and SET, and related literature (e.g. Anderson & Narus 1984, 
1990, Ferguson et al. 2005, Wang 2000), we developed a conceptual model examining outsourcing 
relationship governance (see figure 1). In order to present the model clearly, we would illustrate the 
model from four aspects: (1) transactional attributes; (2) relational attributes; (3) governance 
mechanisms; (4) relational outcomes, outsourcing success and control variables.  
 
Figure 1.  Research model  
3.1 Transactional Attributes  
TCT is the dominate theory in this section. In describing transactions, TCT relies on three key 
dimensions: (1) the condition of asset specificity required to support the transaction; (2) the degree and 
type of uncertainty surrounding the transaction; (3) the frequency of the transaction. Followed Wang 
(2002)’s study, we excluded the last dimension for describing transactions, frequency. It is because 
that we focused on software outsourcing projects, which may well be considered as a distinct, one-
time event and governed by a single contract at the project level. Hence, only asset specificity and 
uncertainty as transactional attributes are examined.  
Asset Specificity refers to “the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative users and by 
alternative users without sacrifice of productive value” (Williamson 1989, p142). In software 
outsourcing, specific asset may be the human capital required from both contractual parties. From 
client’s perspective, the firm may need to train the provider to learn the idiosyncratic business 
operations, complex customer needs and information requirements in customized software project and 
to coordinate with the provider. The resources spent on the IT provider might be totally wasted if the 
contract terminates prematurely. With mass specific investment, the client firm will also be difficult to 
identify other qualified provider who is willing to make the same specialized investments in the 
market. Therefore, three will be clear incentives for the client to maintain a long-term relationship than 
to terminate the contract (Wang 2002).  
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Even though the client may use contract to protect its rights and benefits for the specific investment 
legally (Cannon & Perreault 1999), maintenance of long-term relationships will outperform short-term 
gains for both parties that have invested specific assets. Study also found that firm with specialized 
investments will make gains from long-term cooperation exceed the compensation from short-term 
opportunistic behaviors (Lai & Liu & Yang & Lin & Tsai 2005). Therefore, we could conclude that 
the client firm would prefer to manage the relationship more relationally than contractually under 
specific investment. Thus, we hypothesize:  
H1. The more the specific asset investment, the more the exchange relationship is characterized by 
relational governance than contractual governance.    
Technical Uncertainty is defined as the inability of the client to instruct technical specifications to IT 
supplier for service operation. In customized software outsourcing projects, the functionalities, 
development costs, delivery dates and quality dimensions are difficult to determine and measure at the 
contracting stage (Richmond & Seidmann & whinston 1992). When these problems become severe, 
the contract will be less comprehensive and require more frequent amendments to the rapidly changing 
marketing environments (Wang 2002).  
Because of the uncertainty of the technology, establishing a complete contract accounting for all the 
possible contingencies is problematic. Combining uncertainty with market contracts often opens the 
contracting parties up to self-serving behaviour, opportunism, and excessive transaction costs 
(Schilling & Steensma 2002). A client’s dependence on and long-term orientation toward an IT 
provider can limit its adaptability to changing technological standards. Therefore, when downstream 
markets are unpredictable, the client will avoid using relational governance toward the provider (Heide 
& John 1990).  
A potential response to market uncertainty is for the client to synchronize the switching of suppliers 
with changes in customer composition and preferences (Joshi & Stump 1999), however, since 
switching provider entails costs, this response can be both inefficient and ineffective for the client (e.g. 
Heide & Weiss 1995). Instead, evidences were found that the client may be better to cope with the 
market turbulence by exercising process control (contractual governance) over their suppliers (Joshi & 
Stump 1999). Therefore,  
H2. The more the technological uncertainty, the more the exchange relationship is characterized 
by contractual governance than relational governance.  
3.2 Relational Attributes  
SET is the dominate theory in this section. SET is developed from four sets of theories: exchange 
behaviorism (e.g. Homans 1958), exchange structuralism (e.g. Blau 1964), exchange outcome matrix 
(e.g. Kelley & Thibaut 1978), and exchange network (e.g. Emerson 1962). The related references of 
theories and key concepts are displayed in Table 1. According to the exchange outcome matrix 
research and Anderson & Narus (1984, 1990)’s studies, attraction and dependence (power) were 
chosen as the relational attributes.  
 
Social Exchange Theory References Key Concepts 
Exchange Behaviorism Homans (1958, 1961); Turner (1986); Münch (1993) Attraction, Communication  
Exchange Structuralism 
Blau (1964); Turner (1986); Ritzer (1983);  Münch 
(1993) 
Power, Conflict, Shared 
values, Trust, and 
Commitment 
Exchange Outcome Matrix Kelley & Thibaut (1978); Thibaut & Kelley (1959) Attraction, Dependence 
Exchange Network Emerson (1962, 1972, 1981); Turner (1986) Dependence, Power  
Table 1.  Related Social Exchange Theories (Referring to Sun (2000)).  
Other key concepts, such as communication, conflict, shared values, trust and commitment are not 
incorporated as determinants of control mechanisms because some of them (communication, conflict 
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and shared values) may work as (or overlap with) components of relational governance (Heide & John 
1992) , and some of them (trust and commitment) may work as relational outcomes (Anderson & 
Narus 1990).  
Technical Attraction. According to SET, the willingness to build up the exchange relationship is 
influenced greatly by the rewarding and attraction through the interaction. In one of the most main 
streams of SET studies, a concept tool is used for analyzing dyadic interaction of two parties in the 
exchange relationship: the outcome matrix (Thibaut & Kelley 1959). In the matrix, two constructs are 
worked as bases for evaluation of the outcomes obtained from a particular relationship: the outcomes 
given comparison level (CL) and the comparison level for alternatives (CLalt). CL is used to measure 
the attraction of the client-provider relationship. We focus on technical attraction in this study, which 
is the technical service evaluation outcomes given by the client according to the comparison of 
expectations and real service level performed by the provider (Anderson & Narus 1984, 1990). 
Klepper (1995) believed that attraction is the positive outcomes developed from partnering 
relationships. Anderson and Narus (1990) found if the comparison level of current relationship 
outcome is satisfied (above the CL), then the two parties will have more faith in developing the 
partnership relationship, which would lead to a preference on relational governance based on trust and 
commitment. Under the competitive environment, the client firm would rather maintain the 
relationship with a satisfied provider than to seek an alternative firm that can not guarantee their 
service level. Hence we propose that:  
H3. The higher technical attraction the provider shows, the more the exchange relationship is 
characterized by relational governance than contractual governance. 
IT dependence. Power and dependence have been focal issues in traditional and relational research 
(Dwyer et al. 1987). Anderson and Narus (1984, 1990) used the comparison level for alternatives 
(CLalt), as the measure of dependence. In this study, IT dependence is defined as a standard that 
represents the average service quality of outcomes that are available from the best alternative 
exchange relationship among IT providers.   
Mohr and Spekman (1994) found that the more the benefits that the interacting parties acquired from 
the relationship, the more dependence they will be, consequently, the frequency and importance level 
of the partnership will increase. Hence, long-term oriented relationship will be preferred when the 
client firm is depended on the service provider to fulfill the most critical technical functions in the 
software projects. Therefore, we propose:   
H4. The more the IT dependence shows, the more the exchange relationship is characterized by 
relational governance than contractual governance. 
3.3 Governance Mechanisms  
The concept of a transactional-relational continuum provides an important conceptual context for 
understanding interfirm exchanges in particular (Morgan & Hunt 1994) and relationship in general 
(Nevin 1995). The conceptual background for the continuum is found in the combination of TCT and 
SET.  
Contractual/Relational Governance. Formal contractual governance involves precisely and rigidly 
administering the substantive and remedial rules of control (e.g. Black 1998), and relies on the written 
law as the standard and authority (Black 1976). In this study contractual governance is considered as 
terms of hard, explicit, formal, and written contracts. On the other hand, relational governance is an 
endogenous mechanism that can enhance exchange performance by embedding private and public 
information flows in a matrix of social ties rather than by resorting to contract or its enforcement by a 
third party (Uzzi 1999). The social governance of a relationship involves the common values or norms 
that exist among parties (e.g. Ouchi 1979), which represent important social and organizational 
mechanisms for controlling exchange relationships (Gundlach & Achrol 1993). 
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Though TCT prescribes that contracts can work as safeguards which decrease opportunism, empirical 
studies reveal mixed results for the effectiveness of formal contractual governance on opportunism 
(Hawkins & Wittmann & Beyerlein 2007). Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999) supported TCT by finding 
effect from written contracts reduce the opportunism. Vasylchenko (2005) also found formal control 
benefits financial/technical/strategic exchange performance. On the other hand, several studies found 
opposite effect that increased bureaucratic structuring (control) or contractual governance actually 
increases opportunism (e.g. John 1984), especially when the exchange parties are disagree with 
governing regulations (Gilliland & Manning 2002). However, we found that these “negative” effect of 
contractual governance are mostly based on assumptions of a malfunctioned usage of formal control, 
such as an undue reliance on contract (Macneil 1980) or an usage of detailed contracts without a well 
developed social relationship (Cannon et al. 2000). Normally we believe that contractual governance 
will decrease opportunism according to TCT.  
As for relational governance, previous studies found it positively associated with customer-based 
assessments of exchange performance (e.g. Cannon et al. 2000), and could help to develop shared 
goals, flexibility, mutuality, toleration, and other social patterns that guide the relationship (Black 
1998). These cooperative relationships can build trust and commitment (Morgan & Hunt 1994), which 
mitigate the chance of opportunistic behaviors. 
Furthermore, several studies argued that well negotiated contract can serve as a foundation for the 
successful IT outsourcing relationship (e.g. Kern & Willcocks 2002). In a meta-analysis study 
(Sobrero & Schrader 1998) and an empirical research (Poppo & Zenger 2002), researchers found that 
contractual and relational control mechanisms fulfil different but complementary roles in governing 
the relationship. Hence we could conclude that both control mechanisms will benefit the client-
provider relationships by mitigating the opportunism and building relational commitment. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that:  
H5-6. Contractual and relational governances will negatively influence the degree of provider 
opportunism. 
H7-8. Contractual and relational governance will positively influence the degree of relational 
commitment. 
Even though we believe that both governance mechanisms will affect exchange relationship outcomes, 
their effects on opportunism and commitment may be different. Cavusgil et al. (2004) found that 
formal contracts are negatively related to opportunism but with a nonsignificant effect, while trust as 
relational governance significantly deterred distributor opportunism. Ferguson et al. (2005) also 
identified that relational governance is the predominant governance mechanisms associated with 
exchange performance compared to contractual relationship. Therefore, we propose that  
H9-10. Relational governance will outperform contractual governance on controlling provider 
opportunism and building relational commitment.  
3.4 Relational Outcomes, Outsourcing Success and Control Variables 
Opportunism is the one of assumption of TCT and a central construct of transaction research. 
Relational commitment as a relational outcome construct is important in the area of management (e.g. 
Mohr & Spekman 1994), marketing (e.g. Anderson & Narus 1990) and IS outsourcing (e.g. Lee & 
Kim 1999). Therefore those two constructs were selected as relational outcomes of exchange 
relationships. Prior empirical studies have found vigorous supports for the relationship between 
opportunism and outsourcing success (Wang 2002), and between relational commitment and 
outsourcing success (e.g. Morgan & Hunt 1994). The relationship between relational outcomes and 
outsourcing success were not the focus of this study, therefore, they are not hypothesized.   
Provider Opportunism. Williamson (1985) defined opportunism as self-interest seeking of a strategic 
nature undertaken to redirect profits from vulnerable partners. According to TCT, the phenomenon of 
opportunism encompasses a wide range of specific behaviors or elements: (1) distortion of 
information, such as lying, cheating and stealing, or misrepresenting information; (2) reneging on 
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explicit or implicit commitments such as shirking, and obligations. Jap and Anderson (2003) found 
that either party in an exchange can engage in opportunism. This study we focus on provider 
opportunism.  
Relational  Commitment. Commitment refers to the willingness of trading partners to exert effort on 
behalf of the relationship (Porter et al. 1974). Blau (1964) believed that the firms would try to find the 
most profitable scheme, but once they deem they find it, they will commit to this exchange 
relationship and stop trying to find other alternatives. 
Outsourcing Success, the dependent measure of this research, refers to the overall organizational 
advantage obtained from IS outsourcing. Grover et al. (1996) measured outsourcing performance 
attainment in three aspects of software outsourcing: strategic, economic and technological.  
Two Control Variables would be considered which could influence governance mechanisms and 
relational outcomes, including importance of the project to the client, age of the relationship. 
Performance can be greater in buyer-seller exchange when the buyer regards the seller or the seller’s 
goods most important (Cannon & Perreault 1999). Age of relationship could be an indicator of a 
psychological dependence a close and trustworthy partner (Ferguson et al. 2005).  
4 MODEL VALIDATION 
4.1 Sample  
In order to find the answers for research questions and empirically test the research model, a cross-
sectional postal questionnaire was developed for collecting customized software outsourcing data from 
a group of firms in Chinese Mainland. The questionnaire will ask the top IT executives of the firms to 
answer the survey questions, basing on a major customized software outsourcing project of which 
she/he had the best understanding of the nature and the consequences of the project. Because they are 
typically the most knowledgeable individual concerning a firm’s major outsourcing projects, and 
should also have sufficient ability and information to assess various aspects of outsourcing deals, 
therefore, they were selected as the key informants of the study.  
The survey questionnaires will be mailed to more than 1200 top IT executives in randomly selected 
industries obtained from an online Chinese Enterprises and Products Databases (see 
http://easyaccess.lib.cuhk.edu.hk/login?url=http://hk.wanfangdata.com.cn/wf/swxx/index.html). The 
targeted firms should be large firms with more than 500 employees. In order to avoid the low response 
rate, a follow-up mailing will be initiated. It is followed with personal contact by calling the 
informants of those companies that have not returned the questionnaire. The model will be tested by 
the statistical method of structural equation modeling (SEM). The component-based SEM software, 
partial least square (PLS) will be chosen to test the research model. ANOVA techniques will also be 
used to analyze the comparison relationships.  
4.2 Measures 
Most constructs included in this study are abstract and possibly multidimensional, succinct measures 
were adapted to the current study whenever available in the literature. Table 2 lists their definitions 
and literature.  
 
Variables Definition References 
Technical 
Attraction  
Technical service evaluation outcomes given by the 
client according to the comparison of expectations and 
real service level performed by the provider. 
Anderson & Narus (1984, 1990);  
IT A standard that represents the average IT service Anderson & Narus (1984, 1990), Lee 
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dependence  quality of outcomes that are available from the best 
alternative exchange relationship among IT providers. 




Degree to which an asset can be redeployed to 
alternative users and by alternative users without 
sacrifice of productive value.  
Joshi & Stump (1999), Wang (2002), 
Zaheer & Venkatram (1995) 
Technical 
Uncertainty  
The inability of the client to instruct technical 
specifications to IT supplier for service operation. 
Joshi & Stump (1999), Schilling & 
Steensma (2002), Wang (2002) 
Contractual 
Governance  
Precisely and rigidly administering the substantive and 
remedial rules of control.  
Cannon et al. (2000), Ferguson et al. 
(2005), Gilliland & Manning (2002) 
Relational 
Governance 
An endogenous mechanism that can enhance exchange 
performance by embedding private and public 
information flows in a matrix of social ties rather than 
by resorting to contract.  
Cannon et al. (2000), Ferguson et al. 




Self-interest seeking of a strategic nature undertaken to 
redirect profits from vulnerable partners. 
Jap & Anderson (2003), John (1984), 
Lai et al. (2005), Wang (2002) 
Relational 
Commitment 
The willingness of trading partners to exert effort on 
behalf of the relationship.  
Lee & Kim (1999), Mohr & Spekman 
(1994), Sun (2000).  
Outsourcing 
Success 
The overall organizational advantage obtained from IS 
outsourcing. 
Grover et al. (1996), Lee 2001, Lee & 
Kim 1999, Wang 2002.  
Table 2. Measures of Main Constructs 
5 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This article drew from TCT and SET to develop a model examining client-provider relationship 
governance mechanisms. There are several theoretical implications:  
• The study based on TCT and SET, develops a novel relationship model for investigating the 
management of the client-provider relationship in software outsourcing. It extended IS literature by 
explaining the relationship from transactional/relational attributes to governance mechanisms and 
to relational outcomes. The study offers a potential comprehensiveness lacking in IS outsourcing 
fields through integration of the attributes, interacting relationship governance and relational 
outcomes.  
• Scholars have pointed out the importance of effectively managing IT outsourcing provider. 
(Heckman 1999). This study theoretically expands the knowledge of outsourcing management by 
identifying the role of governance mechanisms on exchange outcomes. Empirical evidence will be 
added to IS fields by identifying which control mechanism would be more effective on reducing 
opportunism or building relational commitment.  
• Furthermore, the study from a holistic perspective examined determinants for use of contractual 
versus relational governance. Based on TCT and SET, asset specificity, technical uncertainty, 
technical attraction, and IT dependence are proposed as antecedents of relationship control 
mechanisms. Importantly, the study also proposed hypotheses on the preferred governances that 
would be used to manage the client-provider relationship under different circumstances.  
• Lastly, there is a growing interesting in opportunism studies, since it is a central construct in 
exchange theory (Jap & Anderson 2003). The model contributes to opportunism studies by 
providing efficient ways to control provider opportunistic behaviors.  
Managerial implications are also found:   
• The findings of this study show that both control mechanisms place a limitation on opportunism 
and promote commitment. In practice, it is better for the managers to use contractual as well as 
relational governance to manage the relationship.  
• The study revels that depend on formal control would not be efficient as governing the relationship 
in a partnering way to control opportunistic behaviors and to form relational commitment.  
• Analyses of governance antecedents will manifest itself for practitioners to choose proper 
management mechanisms when different situation occurs. For example, we propose that when the 
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software project faces technological uncertainty, contractual governance will be a better way of 
relationship management for the client firms.  
6 FUTURE RESESARCH AND CONCLUSION  
Some suggestions for future research are listed as below.  
• Firstly, the study investigated only the customized software outsourcing. However, since 
outsourcing of other IS functions such as the system operations may relate to different transactional 
or relational attributes, comparison studies of relationship management between different IS 
functions are valuable.  
• Secondly, Cavusgil et al. (2004) raised the possibility of examining the interaction effect of both 
governance mechanisms. Cannon et al. (2000) also proposed plural form of governance would the 
exchange performance. Therefore, future research on investigating the interacting effect of 
governance and their effect on relational outcomes will be interesting.  
• Thirdly, since most of small businesses who experience resource poverty in the areas of finance, 
IT/IS skills, time, and planning (AI-Qirim 2003) would be more reluctant to enter into long-term 
relationship than their larger counterparts, studies on relationship governance mechanisms in small 
business would also be an attractive research area in IS field.  
All in all, based on a review of IS outsourcing relationship studies, this study proposed a model on 
how client-provider relationship should be governed to ensure a successful outsourcing relationship. 
We believe that the research agenda we have put forward will be a workable means of helping to 
provide better understanding of the governance mechanisms, its relationship with determinant 
attributes and relational outcomes. Significant benefits could result from further work on both theories 
and empirical studies on the outsourcing client-provider relationship management.  
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